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Note
Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restrictive
Language That Grounded the Unmanned
Industry Should Cease To Govern It
Maxwell Mensinger*
INTRODUCTION
In late 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
issued a $10,000 fine to Raphael Pirker for flying a “five-pound
styrofoam [sic] model airplane” over the University of Virginia.1
The University had hired Lewis Communications to supply aerial photographs and video of its new medical center and campus, and Lewis Communications in turn compensated Pirker
for conducting the flight and capturing the desired film.2 When
the FAA sent him a letter of investigation by e-mail alleging
that he had recklessly operated a small unmanned aerial system (UAS or sUAS)—more colloquially known as a “drone”3—
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; Willamette
University, B.A. 2013. I heartily thank the incredible professors who helped
me write and refine this piece, including Professor Ann Burkhart and Professor Dale Carpenter. I extend this to Professor Sammy Basu and Professor David Gutterman, both of whom supported my early scholarship in my undergraduate years and provided writing advice that haunts me to this day. Many
thanks to my family, friends, and (of course) the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review. Lastly—and perhaps mostly—I thank my wife, Jenna, for
believing in me, and for tolerating the scrambled and innumerable ravings of a
law student thinking far more than is healthy about constitutional property
rights. Copyright © 2015 by Maxwell Mensinger.
1. Patrick Egan, Pirker Submits Reply Brief in Response to the FAA’s
Appeal, SUAS NEWS (May 13, 2014), http://www.suasnews.com/2014/05/29199/
pirker-submits-reply-brief-in-response-to-the-faas-appeal; see also Pirker,
Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631, at *1 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 2014).
2. FAA, PIRKER INVESTIGATION, http://www.scribd.com/doc/223797459/
Pirker-Investigation.
3. Drones, or UAS, come in a variety of shapes and sizes. See, e.g., Ian
Bott, Cleve Jones & John Burn-Murdoch, Great and Small: The Many Types of
Drone, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
2eeba9b0-21d5-11e3-bb64-00144feab7de.html. Their forms span that of the
mammoth Global Hawk to that of Pirker’s five pound Styrofoam model airplane. UAS weighing less than 55 pounds under current law, see FAA Modern-
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and endangered persons and property on the ground, Pirker
fought the allegations.4 The resulting contest ignited a debate
long brewing about the federal government’s role in regulating
UAS in the national airspace.5
The FAA asserts regulatory authority over commercial
UAS.6 Although some commentators argue that the FAA has no
such authority,7 the FAA, unsurprisingly, says otherwise. Its
policy statement, issued in 2007, explains that “no person may
operate a UAS in the National Airspace System without specific authority.”8 Pursuant to this policy, the FAA makes obtaining such authority exceedingly difficult,9 and voraciously seeks
to curb operations that come to its attention.10 In the meantime, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA),
which directs the FAA to issue comprehensive regulations for
the operation of UAS in the national airspace, has substantially
hampered individuals’ ability to utilize UAS for commercial
purposes for the foreseeable future.11

ization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(a)(3), 126 Stat. 11,
77 (2012), are typically referred to as sUAS, or “small” UAS. For simplicity’s
sake, this Note will group UAS and sUAS into the category of “UAS.”
4. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 8095629 (N.T.S.B.
Nov. 17, 2014) rev’g Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6,
2014). Pirker won the first battle, but the N.T.S.B. narrowly reversed on appeal and remanded the case for a determination of recklessness. See Pirker,
2014 WL 8095629, at *5. Pirker and the FAA subsequently settled the case,
and Pirker agreed to pay $1,100 with no admission of wrongdoing or regulatory violation. Pirker Drone Case Reaches Settlement, GEOSPATIAL SOLUTIONS
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://geospatial-solutions.com/pinker-drone-case-reaches
-settlement.
6. See generally FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, §§ 331–36,
(Unmanned Aircraft Systems).
7. See, e.g., Peter Sachs, Current U.S. Drone Law, DRONE L.J. (Dec. 14,
2013), http://dronelawjournal.com; Egan, supra note 1.
8. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72
Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
9. See Wendie L. Kellington & Michael Berger, Why Land Use Lawyers
Care About the Law of Unmanned Systems, 37 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., June
2014, at 1, 4.
10. FAA, FOIA RESPONSE LETTERS, http://www.scribd.com/doc/2046155
20/FAA-FOIA-Response-2-4-14 (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (cease-and-desist
letters).
11. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, §§ 332–36; infra Part
III. Although the FAA began streamlining its approval process and has now
issued over a thousand approvals to companies seeking to use UAS, the universal approval requirements hinder certain individuals and small companies
seeking to use the technology. See Clay Dillow, FAA Approves More than 1,000
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The FAA’s position meets fierce opposition from myriad
scholars12 and organizations13 who preach the value of a thriving UAS industry, alongside concerns that regulatory delay will
stunt its growth.14 The FAA’s cautious approach lags far behind
the process in other countries.15 Although the FAA has released
its proposed regulations,16 the time required for public comment, and the possibility of their revision,17 has led commentators to question the FAA’s capacity to meet the rapidly approaching September 2015 deadline for final rules as specified
in the FMRA.18 Nevertheless, the FAA cites its obligation to
shield the national airspace from the dangers that widespread
UAS presence presents as the prime reason for its delay, and

Commercial Drone Permits, FORTUNE (Aug. 9, 2015), http://fortune.com/
2015/08/09/faa-commercial-drone-permits.
12. See, e.g., Nicholas Ryan Turza, Dr. Dronelove: How We Should All
Learn To Stop Worrying and Love Commercial Drones, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
319 (2014).
13. See Kellington & Berger, supra note 9, at 5.
14. See Bart Jansen, Federal Appeal May Define FAA Authority over
Drones, USA TODAY (July 2, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/business/2014/07/02/ntsb-drones-faa-appeal-pirker/11793203
(noting
the expected industry growth and the effect of probable regulatory delay).
15. See, e.g., Pierre Chauvin, Canada Is Handling Drones Better than the
United States, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 13, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://motherboard
.vice.com/read/canada-has-a-consumer-drone-problem; Brian Fung, The FAA
Won’t Make Up Its Mind on Drone Rules Until 2017 at the Earliest, WASH.
POST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2014/12/10/the-faa-wont-make-up-its-mind-on-drone-rules-until-2017-at-the
-earliest (“Some [businesses] have even threatened to move their drone research overseas if they can’t get permission to operate in the United States.”);
cf. Kellington & Berger, supra note 9, at 4–5 (noting the FAA’s persistent tardiness).
16. See FAA, OVERVIEW OF SMALL UAS NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING: SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED PART 107 (2015), http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_suas_summary
.pdf; Press Release, DOT and FAA Propose New Rules for Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, FAA (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_
releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295 (announcing proposed rules and declaring that all “non-recreational operations” will be subject to them).
17. See Frederic Lardinois, FAA Proposes Rules To Open the Sky to Some
Commercial Drones, but Delivery Drones Remain Grounded, TECHCRUNCH
(Feb. 15, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/15/proposed-faa-rules-will-open
-the-sky-for-some-commercial-drones-but-delivery-drones-remain-grounded
(noting that it could take a year or two before the FAA’s rules, and any changes to them, can take effect).
18. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
§ 332(a)(1), (a)(3), 126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012).
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reasonably so.19 As this Note argues, however, the FAA’s authority to regulate airspace does not, and should not, extend
absolutely to all aspects of the national airspace. Rather, it
should extend predominantly to “navigable airspace.”20
The Supreme Court in United States v. Causby recognized
that Congress’s professed power “to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in [national] air space”
derives in fact from its plenary power, under the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause, “to control navigable airspace.”21 The majority also carved out an individual property interest in “at least
as much of the space above the ground as [the landowner] can
occupy or use in connection with the land.”22 This language
generated significant discussion as to the extent of the individual interest in airspace over one’s land, as well as to the extent
of federal, state, and local authority to regulate that airspace.23
The commercial potential for UAS, and a comprehensive federal obstruction to their use, bring these issues urgently to the
forefront.
Part I of this Note provides a snapshot of the current state
of airspace regulation and explores, in relevant part, the history behind it and the competing theories driving it. Part II proceeds to weigh the validity and respective benefits of these theories insofar as they help or hinder efforts to integrate UAS
into national airspace. Part III then articulates why a more
balanced allocation of regulatory power would serve relevant
individual and governmental interests, as well as the essential
structure of American federalism. The root problem, this Note
suggests, is the FMRA’s exclusion of all commercial UAS from

19. See Taylor Berman, Remote Control Helicopter Partially Decapitates
Teen in Brooklyn Park, GAWKER (Sept. 5, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://gawker.com/
remote-control-helicopter-partially-decapitates-teen-in-1259586314.
20. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 271 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting); see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)–(c) (2015) (defining the low mark of
“navigable airspace” as 1,000 feet above “congested areas” and 500 feet above
“open water or sparsely populated areas”).
21. Causby, 328 U.S. at 271–72 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
22. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
23. See generally Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (holding that the noise from aircraft landing and taking off constituted a taking if it
made nearby homes unbearable for residential use); Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157
(1990) (detailing landowners’ property rights in airspace and pointing out unresolved legal questions).
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the definition of “model aircraft.”24 Redefining “model aircraft”
to allow use “for hobby, recreational, or other use not in or affecting interstate commerce” would pave the way for a richer,
more effective system of airspace regulation, and in doing so,
finally allow the unmanned industry to take flight.
I. HARNESSING AIRSPACE: THE HISTORY BEHIND THE
MODERN FRAMEWORK
Airspace regulation can seem an unintelligible knot, but
this facade can be untangled. Doing so requires a careful review of the regulatory powers that be, and their role throughout history. Section A first explains the origins and early development of airspace law. Section B then provides an overview of
United States v. Causby, a formative decision in the development of airspace regulation, and one that articulates with some
precision the authority underlying federal regulatory efforts.
Notable doctrine flowing from Causby, and its impact on current regulatory efforts, is addressed in Section C. Lastly, Section D reviews the role of the states in harnessing airspace, and
the metric of difference between state and federal regulatory
power in scope, foundation, and significance.
A. COELUM: RELEGATING AIRSPACE TO REGULATION PRECAUSBY
Before the advent of the aircraft, the Latin maxim cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum—or rather, the owner of the
soil owns up to the sky—remained a staple of the common
law.25 Lord Coke promulgated the maxim fervently in his time,
24. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
§ 336(c), 126 Stat. 11, 77−78 (2012). This definition remains controlling under
the FAA’s proposed rules. See supra note 16.
25. See ROBERT R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 7 (1968). The maxim is
thought to have originated under Roman law, and does not refer to ownership
of the air—“aër” was “the gas that flowed over the earth’s surface,” and was
“incapable of appropriation”—but of the “coelum,” or “the area through which
the air flowed,” which remained “capable of private ownership.” STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE
WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 86 (2008). Although there remains uncertainty as to
the nature of the property interest protected by the maxim, see, e.g., Howard
H. Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MINN. L. REV. 773, 777 (1937) (suggesting the maxim only guaranteed a right to freedom from interference, but not
ownership); cf. Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 177 (1836) (“If a tree, the trunk
of which stands on the land of A, extend some of its branches over . . . the land
of B . . . such overhanging branches and the fruit thereof[] [are] the sole property of A . . . .”), American courts frequently invoked the doctrine to identify
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and American courts met it with nearly “unquestioning acceptance.”26 Unsurprisingly, the doctrine’s traditional utility
manifested in tort and property law; specifically, in nuisance,
trespass, and ejectment.27 There seemed little doubt that airspace was, in fact, property, and that the common law afforded
it protection.28 However, in the face of technological innovations, courts grew reluctant to enforce absolutely landowners’
airspace rights under the maxim.29 They increasingly refused
to recognize or compensate actionable trespasses by planes flying thousands of feet above the property in question.30 This, in
turn, posed a troubling prospect: commercial air travel would
constitute “[f]requent and universal trespass on a large scale,
theoretically banned by the law,” but seldom deterred by it.31
Though legal reformers contemplated several different solutions to this problem, sweeping federal regulation, in the
form of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (ACA), ultimately prevailed.32 The ACA, without explicitly saying so, derived its
power from the Commerce Clause⎯it delegated to the Secretary of Commerce critical powers, including the authority to
one’s airspace as one’s property, and intrusion therein as trespass or nuisance.
See generally 2 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 583 (3d ed. 1939) (explaining a landowner’s rights above the surface).
26. TIFFANY, supra note 25.
27. See WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 211.
28. See, e.g., Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491 (1906) (“What
does the term [‘real property’] include so far as the action of ejectment is concerned? . . . The surface of the ground is a guide, but not the full measure; for
within reasonable limitations land includes not only the surface but also the
space above and the part beneath.”); WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 213 (“Blackstone, building upon Coke, had stated that the word ‘land’ includes not only
the face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
29. See BANNER, supra note 25, at 99−101.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 71.
32. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, 44 Stat.
568 (1926); BANNER, supra note 25, at 102–34 (documenting the history and
evolving scope of the Air Commerce Act of 1926). Prior to this Act, many in the
legal community feared extensive federal control in this arena. Some hoped
that courts might ultimately effect a change in the common law, while others
advocated widespread government condemnation of all landowners’ airspace, a
solution which promised peculiar administrative burdens and democratic difficulties. See id. at 98–99. There were also considerable, though ultimately
fruitless, efforts to harmonize state laws on air travel and eliminate inconsistencies that typically make federal interference attractive. See id. at 104.
Though these efforts did not prevail, their ideological underpinnings remain a
persistent, and relevant, counterpoint to federal regulatory efforts.
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“designate and establish civil airways,”33 to prescribe the contours of the navigable airspace,34 and to “[e]stablish air traffic
rules for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft.”35 From the outset, the Act established a salient difference between “air commerce” and “interstate or foreign air
commerce,” and subjected only interstate air commerce to many
of its precepts.36 States, therefore, retained a regulatory role in
the Act’s structure of airspace regulation, so long as State “airspace reservations” were either “necessary” or “not in conflict []
with . . . any civil or military airway [so] designated.”37 In other
words, states were given authority to regulate so long as their
regulations did not interfere with federal regulations. Although
the Act seemed to abrogate the common law coelum maxim, the
regulatory framework created would prove unable to adequately address the regulatory needs prompted by developments in
air travel, and coelum advocates persisted, albeit weakened
somewhat by changing economic and social needs of the time.38
Congress subsequently amended the ACA with the Civil
Aeronautics Act (CAA). The CAA created the Civil Aeronautics
Board, an agency vested with broader powers than the Secre-

33. Air Commerce Act § 5(b). The term “civil airway” was defined as “a
route in the navigable airspace designated by the Secretary of Commerce as a
route suitable for interstate or foreign air commerce.” Id. § 9(j).
34. Id. § 10 (“‘[N]avigable airspace’ means airspace above the minimum
safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce . . . and such
navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate
and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this Act.”).
35. Id. § 3(e).
36. Compare id. § 1 (“‘[A]ir commerce’ means transportation in whole or in
part by aircraft of persons or property for hire, navigation of aircraft in furtherance of a business, or navigation of aircraft from one place to another for
operation in the conduct of a business.”), with id. § 3(c) (“‘[I]nterstate or foreign air commerce’ means air commerce between any State, Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside thereof; or between
points within the same State, Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia, but through the airspace over any place outside thereof; or wholly
within the airspace over any Territory or possession or the District of Columbia.”), and supra notes 33–34.
37. Air Commerce Act § 4; see also id. § 1 (defining “interstate or foreign
air commerce” in a manner that excludes air navigation confined to intrastate
commerce).
38. Cf. Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977, 982 (1936) (recognizing landowners’ “exclusive right to so much of the space above as may be
actually occupied and used by him and necessarily incident to such occupation
and use” (emphasis added)).
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tary of Commerce under the ACA.39 The CAA contained a noticeably stronger definition of air commerce that included “interstate . . . air commerce . . . by aircraft or any operation or
navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil airway or
any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or
which may endanger safety in, interstate . . . air commerce.”40 It
granted citizens “a public right of freedom of transit in air
commerce through the navigable air space of the United States”
in a separate section, rather than in the navigable airspace section.41 Taken together, the changes reflected Congress’s move
towards a heavier federal influence in the regulation of airspace. It preserved the public right of access to the navigable
airspace granted in the ACA, but implied that any air commerce within non-navigable airspace would remain subject to
extensive federal regulation.42
However substantial this federal influence became, its
purpose remained confined to smoothing relations between air
carriers and ensuring safe travel in a manner comparable to
the ACA⎯not abrogating all private interest in airspace.43 The
Supreme Court’s paradigmatic decision in United States v.
Causby addressed this limitation directly, using the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause as a vessel.44
B. CAUSBY, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE TAKING OF
AIRSPACE
The federal government’s authority to regulate airspace is
“bottomed on the commerce power of Congress.”45 On this basis,
congressional authority over the navigable airspace mirrored

39. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, §§ 701–02, 52
Stat. 973, 1012–14 (1938) (creation and organization of board, duties of the
board); see also 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1940).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 401 (emphasis added). Similarly important definitions,
such as those of “civil airway” and “navigable air space,” remained virtually
unchanged. Id.
41. Id. § 403.
42. See id.
43. See id. §§ 2–3; Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344,
§§ 1–2, 44 Stat. 568, 568–69 (1926).
44. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–67 (1946) (holding
that the interference of use and enjoyment of land by low and frequent flying
aircraft constitutes a taking); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4 (“[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
45. Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590,
596 (1954).

2015]

REMODELING “MODEL AIRCRAFT”

413

Congress’s plenary power over navigable waters.46 The ACA’s
legislative history confirms this, linking the declaration of what
constitutes both navigable airspace and navigable waters to
federal authority over interstate commerce.47 Although Congress considered using its war power to commandeer airspace⎯subsuming state power therein⎯it notably chose a different route.48
This so-called “different route” remains expansive in many
respects. The unfettered commerce power “acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution
[sic].”49 The Court has identified three categories of activity to
which it extends: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate
commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”50 Intrastate
activities are not exempt where “the interstate and intrastate
aspects of commerc[ial] [activity are] so mingled together that
full regulation of interstate commerce require[s] incidental regulation of intrastate commerce.”51 Likewise, where regulation
of small-scale intrastate activities constitutes “an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated,” such regulation is constitutionally permissible.52 Nonetheless, the Constitution requires a distinction be46. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting); Scott P. Keifer,
Aircraft Overflights as a Fifth Amendment Taking: The Extension of Damages
for the Loss of Potential Future Uses to Avigation Easements, 4 MO. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 88, 92 & n.87 (1996) (“[A]ir space . . . present[s] as to transportation practical and legal problems similar to those presented by transportation
by vessels upon the high seas.”).
47. Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 596–97 (citing legislative history).
48. See CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED
WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY WHICH PRODUCED IT, AND THE PRECEDENTS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED 67 (1939). One of the prime reasons for this
choice seems to be Congress’s desire to consolidate authority over air, water,
and railroad transportation so as to ensure “impartial regulation . . . by a body
which has no greater responsibility for or interest in one than another.” Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938: Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the H.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 32 (1937) (statement
of Hon. Joseph B. Eastman, Interstate Commerce Commission).
49. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824) (commerce on navigable waters).
50. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 554 (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
52. Id. at 561. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(holding that Congress’s commerce power extends to intrastate activities
which affect interstate commerce).
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tween that which is “truly national” and “truly local,” and areas
traditionally within the ambit of States’ “police power”53 remain
particularly resistant to this centralized authority.54
At the time United States v. Causby caught the Supreme
Court’s attention, Congress’s authority to regulate airspace under the Commerce Clause was not in question; it was assumed
that such authority extended as far as its commerce power allowed.55 Rather, the majority opinion in Causby, penned by
Justice Douglas, directly addressed the modern utility of the
coelum maxim, and its incompatibility with flight technology.
Plaintiffs owned a chicken farm plagued by frequent military
overflights that generated sounds and lights so disruptive that
they spooked upwards of 150 chickens who flew into the walls
and died.56 The owners argued that these low-altitude flights
constituted a “taking” of their property for public use within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.57 While the Court rejected the coelum maxim as having “no place in the modern world,”
it agreed that the overflights had “taken” property from the
owners.58 Both the majority opinion and Justice Black’s dissent
relied on an interpretation of the ACA, and its definition of
“navigable airspace.”59
Causby expressly found a property interest in the “immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere,” which signaled
the Court’s view on the extent of Congressional authority in
airspace.60 As the majority reasoned, frequent, low overflights
53. Police power includes “[t]he power of a state to enforce laws for the
health, welfare, morals, and safety of its citizens, if enacted so that the means
are reasonably calculated to protect those legitimate state interests.” State Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This power is discussed
in greater detail infra Part I.D.
54. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
55. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946); id. at 272
(Black, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 259 (majority opinion).
57. See id. at 258.
58. Id. at 261; see also id. at 267 (finding that “a servitude ha[d] been imposed upon the land”).
59. Compare id. at 263−64 (recognizing the importance of placing “navigable airspace . . . within the public domain” to interstate commerce in the
modern world, and affirming that the “Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of
course, the power to prescribe air traffic rules”), with id. at 271−72 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that because “the Constitution entrusts Congress with
full power to control all navigable airspace,” and further, because “there was
no showing that the bombers flying over [the chicken farm] violated any rule
or regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority,” there could be no taking).
60. Id. at 264 (majority opinion).
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that disturbed an individual’s ability to use and enjoy her land
had “taken” an easement thereto.61 Surely, this holding—in a
Fifth Amendment context—does not cut to the roots of the issue
presented here: that is, whether Congress exceeds the bounds
of its commerce power when regulating the use of non-navigable
airspace within the “immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”62 Nor could it, considering the issue was not before
the Causby court. Additionally, the Takings context (in which
issues regarding airspace typically arise) differs in fundamental ways from the Commerce Clause context.63
This disjunction does not minimize Causby’s relevance to
the Commerce Clause questions at issue in this Note. Indeed,
Justice Douglas offhandedly addressed the tension between
Causby’s corporeal Takings issue and its spectral Commerce
Clause shadow. Although he did so in dicta, and only to a limited extent, it was to this limited extent that the majority and
the dissenters disagreed. The majority found a taking despite
the fact that the “path of the glide” was “approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority,” because “Congress” had not placed this
airspace in the public domain by deeming it navigable.64 Justice Black, by contrast, understood the ACA and CAA as giving,
pursuant to its Commerce power, “the Civil Aeronautics Authority exclusive power to determine what is navigable airspace
subject to its exclusive control,” making a taking impossible
61. Id. at 266.
62. Id. at 264.
63. This Note recognizes a basic incompatibility between the substance of
Takings Clause challenges and Commerce Clause challenges. When faced with
a Takings challenge, a court asks, in general, whether private property has
been taken by a federal, state, or local governmental entity for public use; if so,
compensation is due the landowner. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005). By contrast, a Commerce Clause challenge suggests that the
federal government has regulated something not in or substantially affecting
interstate commerce; if successful, the regulation is considered ultra vires and
invalid. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). When courts
find a taking under the Fifth Amendment, therefore, it follows that such finding remains mutually exclusive from consideration of the merits of any alternative Commerce Clause challenge Plaintiff might posit with respect to the
validity of a regulation. The source of authority is different, and so the inquiry
is likewise different. Nevertheless, principles derived from both categories of
constitutional challenges remain helpful in illustrating the regulatory landscape with which this Note grapples.
64. Causby, 328 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added) (“If that agency prescribed
83 [sic] feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the
question of the validity of the regulation.” (emphasis added)). This part of the
opinion likely constitutes dicta, but, as discussed infra, it sowed lasting confusion.
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where, as in Causby, the flight paths at issue were approved by
that agency.65 In short, the majority and the dissent found different actors constitutionally responsible for different things,
and to different extents.
From this disagreement sprung curiosity as to who “calls
the shots” over what quantity of airspace: What powers could
Congress delegate to executive agencies? Did control over navigable airspace entail control over non-navigable airspace as
well? If so, to what extent? And the (much) later arrival of the
Court’s Lopez and Morrison opinions, which narrow the scope of
Congress’s Commerce powers, only muddied the ongoing debate. Of necessity, it seems the Causby Court left these questions to future courts and congresses. As will be shown, those
operating in Causby’s wake have provided conceptually different answers.
C. SPACE AS A DISCRETE DYNAMIC OF REGULATION IN AIRSPACE
POST-CAUSBY
Following the Causby decision, views on the extent of the
federal government’s authority to regulate airspace remained
in flux, due in part to the apparent dichotomy between navigable and non-navigable airspace. As the Takings doctrine progressed, differing views emerged as to the significance of this
spatial division. One reason for this may be dicta in Causby ostensibly linking the bounds of navigable airspace with the
bounds of Takings liability.66 Indeed, following the decision,
Congress replaced the ACA with the Federal Aviation Act, establishing the FAA to further enhance the safe and efficient use
of airspace,67 and reconfiguring the bounds of navigable airspace to include the space needed for take-off and landing.68
There remained, however, the reality that overflights within navigable airspace could not easily be classified as less intrusive per se to individuals’ “prerogatives of ownership”—a
right that Causby expressly recognized,69 and which the coelum
65. Id. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 264 (majority opinion) (“If any airspace needed for landing
or taking off were included [in the definition of navigable airspace], flights
which were so close to the land as to render it uninhabitable would be immune.”).
67. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 731
(1958).
68. Id. § 101, 72 Stat. at 739.
69. See Cahoon, supra note 23, at 172–73. Even the federal government
“concede[d]” to the Causby Court that overflights in the navigable airspace
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maxim traditionally protected.70 If a plane lopped off the roof of
one’s house while landing, for instance, no court could find the
government immune to Takings liability, no matter how “navigable” Congress made such airspace.71
In Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment, a tax case, the Supreme Court further
deemphasized (albeit indirectly) the significance of the barrier
between navigable and non-navigable airspace with respect to
the protection of this individual interest.72 The Court suggested
in dicta that federal acts regulating “air commerce” were “not
[founded] on national ownership of the navigable air space,” but
rather the commerce power, and thus that their “breadth covers all commercial intercourse.”73 This position affirmed widespread federal control of airspace, while placing little import in
the spatial distinction between navigable and non-navigable
airspace.
A different school of thought arose from the Court of
Claims in Aaron v. United States.74 The Aaron court proposed a
less flexible Takings standard that rested heavily on the spatial
distinction between navigable and non-navigable airspace:
namely, that “what may be permissible above [the floor of the
navigable airspace] is forbidden below it, unless compensation
is paid therefor.”75 Although this standard strengthened landowners’ Takings claims as to flights below the navigable airspace, it obliterated them with respect to overflights within the
bounds of navigable airspace.76 This view, therefore, treats navwhich rendered property below uninhabitable “would be a taking,” a fact
which reinforces the persisting importance of the individual’s right to exclude
others from her airspace recognized in Causby. See 328 U.S. at 264.
70. See TIFFANY, supra note 25.
71. Cahoon, supra note 23, at 165.
72. See id. at 178; see also Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equal. &
Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 596 (1954) (stating that Causby held that “the owner of
land might recover for a taking by national use of navigable air space, resulting in destruction in whole or in part of the usefulness of the land property”).
73. Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 596–97.
74. 311 F.2d 798, 801 (1963) (affirming the Trial Commissioner’s determination that only “owners of property over which planes flew [beneath the
boundary separating navigable from non-navigable airspace] were entitled to
compensation”).
75. Id.
76. The same Court qualified this rule somewhat in Branning v. United
States, when it held that a taking “is not precluded merely because the flights
of Government aircraft are in what Congress has declared to be navigable airspace and subject to its regulation.” 654 F.2d 88, 99 (1981) (per curiam). But in
general, a plaintiff will encounter more difficulty before a court applying Aa-
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igable and non-navigable airspace as separate spheres of influence, the former “belonging” to the federal government, and the
latter “belonging” to individuals. The federal government becomes an intruder when it reaches beneath the barrier fencing
it in.
Both the Braniff and Aaron views recognize, at least impliedly, that airspace remains “subject to pervasive governmental control.”77 But the latter seems to consider this control less
pervasive, at least in non-navigable airspace, than the former
does. Where the former condones sweeping federal regulation,
the latter condemns it. The precedents apply concurrently, but
imply differing theories of who controls what airspace. And the
federal government, though omnipresent in the history of airspace regulation, is not alone in its regulatory efforts. States,
too, play an active role in steering the development of airspace
regulation. Moreover, managing the possible impact of technological innovations like UAS seems to fall squarely within their
spheres of influence.
D. AIRSPACE AND STATE POLICE POWER
While the federal government grappled with uncertainties
regarding the constitutional extent of its regulatory presence in
national airspace at the dawn of the twentieth century, states
and municipalities fought a two-front war.78 On one front,
states sought to shield localized airspace regulations from federal preemption, a problem that would magnify in coordination
with the volume of federal regulation.79 On the other, they
sought to impose land use limitations on communities.80 The
rise of Euclidian zoning in the 1920s81 saw states and municiron’s standard.
77. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 448, 453 (2004).
78. See BANNER, supra note 25, at 30 (“Aviators and lawyers were, of
course, the primary participants in the . . . debate, but they weren’t the only
ones. The ownership of space was of interest to all sorts of people for all sorts
of reasons, whether or not they intended to take to the air themselves.”). See
generally id. at 4–42 (discussing the evolution of aviation and the ownership of
airspace).
79. See Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 595 & n.11 (1954) (“[T]he states did not consider their sovereignty affected by the [ACA] except to the extent that the states had ceded that sovereignty
by constitutional grant.”).
80. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (upholding an Ohio village council’s zoning ordinance as a valid exercise
of authority).
81. See id.
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palities frequently utilize police power to regulate the manner
in which individuals use property, despite the onerous repercussions this practice sometimes wreaked on landowners.82
Among the many considerations involved in local land use
regulations are the desired uses (or undesirable misuses) of airspace.83 Height restrictions consistent with legitimate governmental interests in “light, air and aesthetics,” among other
things, are constitutionally permitted and frequently enacted.84
Pursuant to local interests in suppressing nuisance, a function
of local police power, municipalities also assume substantial responsibility for siting airports in a manner that ensures respect
for individual interests in airspace.85 Technological innovations
involving the use of airspace—such as crop dusters and upscale wind turbines—similarly implicate local interests in
health, safety, and the general welfare.86 As such, these developments regularly necessitate legislative action from state and
municipal authorities, and issues arising from their use are
evaluated predominantly under standards arising from state or
local law,87 though not exclusively.88 This local regulatory
82. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (refusing to find
a taking where state regulation was a valid exercise of its police power, despite
harsh effects on the plaintiff’s brickmaking business); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 662 (1887) (“[If] a state deems the absolute prohibition of the manufacture and sale [of liquor] within her limits . . . to be necessary to the peace
and security of society, the courts cannot, without usurping legislative functions, override the will of the people . . . .”).
83. See WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 385.
84. See id.; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1923).
85. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (holding a
county liable for a taking in its capacity as “promoter, owner, and lessor of the
[subject] airport” despite substantial federal oversight and grants made thereto pursuant to a federal “National Airport Plan”); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962) (en banc) (same); Kellington & Berger, supra
note 9, at 7. See generally E. Tazewell Ellett, The National Air Transportation
System: Design by City Hall?, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 1–3 (1987) (discussing local government interests in minimizing liability for airport-related nuisance).
86. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.117 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 160.12 (West 2014) (proposed legislation).
87. Compare Wilson v. Greg Williams Farm, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 485, 488
(Ark. 2014) (finding low-altitude application of pesticides not to be an inherently dangerous activity under state law), with Yancey v. Watkins, 708 S.E.2d
539, 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (finding low-altitude application of pesticides an
inherently dangerous activity under state law).
88. See Michael J. Holland, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century:
Preemption in the Field of Air, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 11, 11 (2011) (“Courts have
increasingly looked to federal law to determine liability and standard of care
for such issues as in-flight air operations, pilot training and air space management, but they have been more reluctant to hold that federal law preempts
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framework, thus illustrated, reflects the reality that federal interests in the national airspace intersect with states’ and municipalities’ interests in protecting persons and property in
their jurisdictions, promoting beneficial use of natural resources, and compensating victims of negligent or harmful conduct in overlying airspace.
As illustrated, states and municipalities take an active role
in shaping and defining the rights individuals enjoy in airspace, and they do so with their police power. Federal legislation, however, can dilute these efforts, and the resulting tension resulting therefrom simmers indefinitely, unaddressed and
unresolved. With commercial UAS use, conflicting interests and
authority threaten to boil this conflict over. That the current
regulatory framework serves federal, state, municipal, and individual interests imperfectly seems evident. Only after untangling the relevant considerations may a solution to this puzzle
present itself.
II. TURBULENCE: RECONCILING HISTORY, DOCTRINE,
AND EXPERIENCE
As the history shows, airspace regulation is a forum where
divergent (and sometimes complementary) interests collide.
The players are established, but the balance and allocation of
power among them is shifting. The authority for action at each
level is stated plainly, but its precise mechanism varies drastically depending on the circumstances and the stakes. Resulting
ambiguities and uncertainties cause turbulence for developing
industries—here, the UAS industry—and those seeking to unlock their potential. Section A parses the Pirker decisions introduced at the beginning of this Note, and their implications
as a tableau of the modern regulatory landscape. Section B
then evaluates in greater detail the grounds for federal regulation of UAS under the Commerce Clause. Finally, Section C assesses the objects and consequences of current statutes and
regulatory efforts bearing on UAS operations.
A. HUERTA V. PIRKER AND THE FMRA: THE MODERN
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Recall Raphael Pirker, who was fined $10,000 for flying a
five-pound Styrofoam plane, equipped with a camera, over the
state law in such areas as product manufacturing defects, failure to warn and
on-ground aviation accidents.”).
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University of Virginia.89 When the FAA first brought him before the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),90 Pirker’s central argument was that his Styrofoam model airplane
qualified as a “model aircraft,” and that the FAA had no authority to regulate the use of model aircraft for any purpose.91
He rested this argument on the FAA’s 1981 Advisory Circular,
which “encourage[d] voluntary compliance” with enumerated
safety standards, despite the “hazard” they might pose to “fullscale aircraft in flight and to persons and property on the surface.”92 This Circular, which preceded the FMRA and was thus
instructive at the time, did not prohibit commercial use of model aircraft.93
The FAA responded with a three-step argument: (1) that
Pirker’s flight was “for compensation”;94 (2) that, in light of this
compensation, his alleged “model aircraft” was in fact not a
model aircraft, but a UAS “aircraft” falling squarely within the
FAA’s purview;95 and (3) that “as a consequence,”96 his flight
recklessly endangered the life and property of others in violation of federal regulations.97 In essence, the FAA sought to assert regulatory control over what would otherwise be a model
aircraft because it was flown for commercial purposes, an argument never before made.
89. See Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631, at *1–2 (N.T.S.B.
Mar. 6, 2014).
90. Id. As discussed above, the FAA fined Pirker $10,000 for flying a
Styrofoam plane over the University of Virginia; the subsequent challenge is
discussed infra.
91. See Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2.
92. ADVISORY CIRCULAR, FAA DOC. 91-57 (June 9, 1981) (requesting that
“[m]odelers . . . [1] [s]elect an operating site that is of sufficient distance from
populated areas . . . [2] not operate model aircraft in the presence of spectators
until . . . flight tested and proven airworthy . . . [3] not fly model aircraft higher than 400 feet above the surface” and “[4] [g]ive right of way to, and avoid
flying in the proximity of, full-scale aircraft”).
93. See id.
94. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2.
95. Id. See generally Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
91) (requiring “specific authority” to operate UAS in the “National Airspace
System,” and distinguishing between (1) “UAS operating as public aircraft”;
(2) “UAS operating as civil aircraft”; and (3) “model aircraft [for which] the authority is AC 91–57”).
96. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2.
97. See Careless or Reckless Operation, 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2015) (“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger
the life or property of another.” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 1.1 (“Aircraft
means a device . . . used for flight in the air.”).
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In a controversial opinion, Judge Geraghty dismissed the
FAA’s complaint and found that the “[m]odel aircraft operation
by [Pirker was] subject only to the FAA’s requested voluntary
compliance with the Safety Guidelines stated in AC 91-57,” and
that “model aircraft” did not qualify as “aircraft” for the purposes of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13.98 In their excitement, UAS enthusiasts failed to take adequate note of Judge Geraghty’s more
loaded final finding: “[s]pecifically, that at the time of [Pirker’s]
model aircraft operation . . . there was no enforceable FAA
rule . . . applicable to model aircraft or for classifying model
aircraft as an UAS.”99
On appeal, the NTSB narrowly reversed Judge Geraghty’s
determination that the FAA could not prosecute reckless operation of “model aircraft,” but its decision on appeal merely reflected rules already codified in the FMRA.100 Indeed, after
Judge Geraghty rendered his original decision, the FAA requested that the FMRA’s definition of model aircraft supersede
the AC 91-57’s voluntary guidelines for precisely this reason.101
The FMRA unambiguously defines “model aircraft” and exempts them from regulation insofar as they do not endanger
the national airspace system;102 a UAS operated for commercial
purposes (that is, purposes that are neither hobbyist nor recreational) does not qualify as a “model aircraft.”103 Such devices
therefore are subject to the FAA’s regulations. Because the
98. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *7−8; see also supra notes 91–92, 95.
99. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *5 (emphasis added).
100. See id. Curiously, in finding for the FAA, the NTSB recognizes that
“certain provisions of the [Federal Aviation Regulations] may not be logically
applicable to model aircraft flown for recreational purposes. But nothing in the
text of the document disclaims, implicitly or explicitly, the . . . interest in regulating operations of model aircraft that pose a safety hazard.” Id. (emphasis
added). Why a model aircraft should pose an additional, legally relevant safety
hazard when converted to a commercial use—thereby losing its status as
“model aircraft” under the FMRA—goes unaddressed in the opinion.
101. See Sachs, supra note 7. The FMRA defines “model aircraft” in relevant part as an aircraft “limited to not more than 55 pounds” and “flown strictly for hobby or recreational use” in accordance with “a community-based set of
safety guidelines.” FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-95, § 336(a)(1)–(3), 126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012).
102. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 336.
103. Id. Under the FAA’s proposed rules, those operating UAS would have
to be vetted by the TSA, pass an FAA-approved aeronautical knowledge test
every two years, obtain a certificate similar to a pilot airman certificate, and
more. See generally supra note 16 (listing proposed operational limitations,
aircraft requirements, and operator responsibilities pertaining to UAS and
those who operate them).
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FMRA’s definition currently governs, Pirker-esque flights today
undoubtedly violate federal law.104 Whether this state of the
law is consistent with the history and purpose of airspace regulation, however, proves the more relevant issue.
B. CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT
TOO?
The FMRA’s prohibition on commercial operation of UAS
flows from Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Congress did not, however, include a jurisdictional hook in the
statutory text,105 and thus the mechanism of the prohibition
remains obscure; the explanation for why the operation of
commercial UAS in non-navigable airspace qualifies per se as
“interstate commerce”106 does not immediately present itself. It
seems uncontroversial to note that some small-scale commercial UAS use does not significantly impact interstate commerce,
and no court or congress has explicitly established (on a national scale) that all airspace is a channel of commerce, with all
activity therein falling within the ambit of Congress’s Commerce power. Of course, this does not establish that Congress
cannot regulate small-scale UAS activity in non-navigable airspace on these grounds; it merely indicates that such regulatory reach is novel, and therefore requires a justification. As
such, Congress would likely assert the following justifications
for the prohibition: (1) that commercial UAS are instrumentalities of commerce; (2) that all commercial UAS use substantially
affects interstate commerce per se; or (3) that non-navigable
airspace, like navigable airspace, is a channel of commerce.107
An argument that commercial UAS are instrumentalities
of commerce ignores contradictory precedent. In United States
104. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 336(b); Kellington & Berger,
supra note 9, at 7 (“Given that in FMRA [sic] Congress says that FAA may enforce its rules against sUAS [small UAS] users, it is logical to assume that
Congress meant FAA’s rules to be applied to sUAS users as well. . . . Therefore, the [original] Pirker decision may have little bearing on the operations of
sUAS in a post FMRA world.”).
105. The Supreme Court has found Congress’s decision to exclude a “jurisdictional element” in a statute—for instance, “in or affecting interstate commerce”—as persuasive evidence that the statute falls outside the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561 (1995) (“[The statute] contains no jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce.” (emphasis added)).
106. Id. at 554.
107. See id. at 558–59.
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v. Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in a school zone; that firearms in
themselves are commodities bought, sold, and carried in interstate commerce did not constitute a persuasive defense of the
statute.108 The FMRA similarly prohibits commercial UAS activity, not the “interstate transportation of a commodity,” and
as such cannot be said to regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce.109
An alternative argument that all commercial UAS use substantially affects interstate commerce per se, though somewhat
more persuasive than the latter argument, likewise proves an
insufficient defense of the FMRA. Although commercial operation of UAS plainly seems an economic activity—unlike carrying a firearm,110 possessing marijuana,111 or gender-motivated
violence112—and some uses are easily classified as serving “truly national” purposes,113 the technology can certainly be (and
has certainly been) adapted to serve “truly local” purposes as
well.114 Without a jurisdictional element,115 which would “ensure[] through case-by-case inquiry” that even small-scale
commercial UAS use substantially affects interstate commerce,
defending the FMRA’s constitutionality on these grounds would
prove difficult.116
The most contentious inquiry is whether non-navigable
airspace qualifies as a channel of commerce. Since the inception
of airspace regulation, navigable airspace was established for
the purpose of facilitating interstate air commerce.117 The CAA
108. Id. at 559.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20 (2005).
112. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (“[G]endermotivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense, economic activity.”).
113. Id. at 599; see, e.g., AMAZON PRIME AIR, http://www.amazon.com/b?
node=8037720011 (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
114. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599; see also Drones Hit Roadblock on Path
To Become Farming Tool, FARMING DRONES (July 27, 2014), http://farming
drones.com/drones-hit-roadblock-on-path-to-become-farming-tool-business.
115. But see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (“Where the class of
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”
(quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968))).
116. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
117. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, § 9(c), 44
Stat. 568, 574 (“‘[C]ivil airway’ means a route in the navigable airspace designated . . . as a route suitable for interstate or foreign air commerce.” (emphasis
added)).
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granted a “public right of freedom of transit”118 in the navigable
airspace and delegated to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics the power to establish civil airways for the purposes of
interstate air commerce within that airspace.119 Although “navigable airspace” is merely airspace “above the minimum altitudes of flight,” the very distinction between “air commerce”
and “interstate . . . or foreign air commerce” implies an understanding that the navigable airspace would be a channel of interstate commerce.120 Regulation thereof naturally fell within
the ambit of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
As Justice Black contended in his Causby dissent, however,
Congress’s authority over navigable airspace, like its authority
over navigable waters, is “plenary.”121 Cases preceding Causby
found ample support for broad congressional authority over
navigable waters “as broad as the needs of commerce,” and not
limited merely to “control for navigation.”122 In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, Justice Rehnquist remarked that “[r]eference
to . . . navigability . . . adds little if anything to the breadth of
Congress’ regulatory power over interstate commerce,” and that
such regulatory power must be understood “in terms of more
traditional Commerce Clause analysis than by reference to
[navigability].”123 By analogy, one might suggest that nonnavigable airspace, if a host to “air commerce,”124 should qualify as a channel of commerce.125
In light of the statutory history of airspace regulation,
however, this conclusion stretches too far. Only navigable airspace was thought a venue for interstate commerce, and such
airspace is unambiguously identifiable, unlike certain bodies of
water, which may or may not be navigable.126 There exists no

118. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 3, 52 Stat. 973,
980 (1938).
119. Id. § 301.
120. Id. §§ 1(3), (16), (20), (24).
121. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 272 (Black, J., dissenting).
122. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426
(1940).
123. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1979).
124. See, e.g., Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, 44
Stat. 568, 568 (1926).
125. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005)
(identifying “airspace” as a channel of commerce).
126. See, e.g., PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012)
(“The Daniel Ball [“navigability in fact”] formulation has been invoked in considering the navigability of waters for purposes of assessing federal regulatory
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dispute as to what constitutes navigable and non-navigable airspace because the distinction is clearly delineated, and the
quality that makes airspace navigable (altitude) is a definite
and inalienable characteristic of the spatial corridor to which it
belongs. For this reason, the scope of federal power over water
may extend further than it does over airspace by virtue of the
indefinite qualities that make water navigable, and the resulting need for more expansive legislative reach. At the very least,
the government could therefore argue that the proximity of activities within non-navigable airspace to those within navigable
airspace, and the risk that reckless operation of UAS in nonnavigable airspace could pose a danger to interstate commerce
in navigable airspace, might permit coordinate regulation of all
airspace. In other words, although non-navigable airspace is
not a channel of commerce, collateral regulation of nonnavigable airspace, undergone to protect the integrity of navigable airspace, is permitted under Congress’s commerce power.
If this is the case, then the regulatory framework currently
in place is riddled with inconsistencies. On the one hand, the
FAA’s AC 91-57, as interpreted by the FAA, prohibits operation
of UAS absent a certificate of authorization,127 and obtaining a
certificate of authorization has proven immensely complex and
difficult.128 That the NTSB vacillated in recognizing any binding authority to reinforce the FAA’s safety argument, without
even considering the incipient commerce issues on the table,
complicates this development.129 On the other hand, the FMRA
reserves for the FAA Administrator the power “to pursue enforcement action against persons operating model aircraft who
endanger the safety of the national airspace system,” but it denies the administrator the power to promulgate any other rules
regarding model aircraft flown for hobby or recreational purposes.130 Why should a model aircraft, at first subject only to a
generalized safety requirement, suddenly become subject to an
authority under the Constitution, and the application of specific federal statutes, as to the waters and their beds.”).
127. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72
Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). Under the
proposed rules, this requirement would not be as stringent, although a similar
requirement would apply. See supra note 103.
128. See, e.g., Astraeus Aerial, Docket No. FAA-2014-0352 (FAA Sept. 25,
2014).
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
§ 336(b), 126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012).
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expansive system of regulation when its owner converts it to a
commercial use? The implicit distinction here between hobbyist
and commercial uses seems arbitrary in light of the identical
safety risks posed by both commercial UAS and model aircraft.
To wit, there is no clear reason why commercial UAS in nonnavigable airspace pose more danger to airspace as a channel of
commerce than hobbyist model aircraft.
The FMRA’s “model aircraft” exemption demonstrates, by
its own terms, that low altitude, small-scale commercial UAS
use poses little, if any, additional danger to persons or property
on the ground than do “model aircraft.” The FAA’s safety concerns, though not resolved by the FMRA, are addressed in the
FMRA’s definition of “model aircraft,” which demands operation of a small UAS (that is, less than 55 pounds) “in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines”131 in “a
manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any
manned aircraft,”132 and which involves communication with
airport operators when in close proximity to airports.133 When
operated in accordance with these standards, the UAS is already immune to regulation; if an operator ignores these
standards, then she stands vulnerable to prosecution by the
FAA.134 That commercial UAS operators would need to comply
with these safety requirements as well detracts significantly
from arguments that suggest such use is inherently more dangerous than “model aircraft” use as currently defined. Without
a more compelling distinction between the risks and capacities
of commercial UAS versus model aircraft, the government’s authority to comprehensively regulate either diminishes.
C. COMPETING VALUES: OVERLYING IMPERFECTION VERSUS
UNDERLYING PERFECTION
As it stands, non-navigable airspace likely does not in itself
qualify as a channel of commerce. But this would not stand in
the way of regulations promulgated for the purpose of protecting the navigable airspace, which is a channel of commerce.
Whether this reasoning vindicates the FMRA’s prohibition on
commercial UAS may therefore depend on the significance given the spatial distinction between navigable and non-navigable
131. Id. § 336(a)(2).
132. Id. § 336(a)(4).
133. Id. § 336(a)(5).
134. Rafael Pirker’s case seems an apt example in this respect. See id.; see
also supra Part II.A.
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airspace. Under the Braniff view,135 the individual’s right to
use airspace exists “subject to the dominant servitude in the
United States to regulate commerce in the air.”136 This view
permits a great degree of federal intrusion into otherwise private airspace, so long as the intrusion may be tied to commercial intercourse. The Aaron view, however, which presumes a
taking when the federal government so intrudes, stands for the
proposition that such intrusions require compensation, even if
grounded on constitutional powers.137 The prime difference between these views rests on their regard for individuals’ substantive rights in airspace.
Although one might contend that the Braniff is most consistent with the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine,
one might contend with equal force that the Aaron view is most
consistent with the structure of federalism among the governmental entities that comprise the United States. Because Aaron sets a concrete hurdle in the path of the federal regulations
of non-navigable airspace, it deters sweeping federal regulation
and allows states more leeway to shape and define individual
rights to utilize non-navigable airspace. Braniff, by contrast,
may encourage sweeping federal regulation affecting nonnavigable airspace, which, although likely permissible under
the Commerce Clause, may phase out states’ influence on the
rights enjoyed therein.
Because FAA regulations and the FMRA substantially circumscribe all commercial UAS use, regardless of whether it affects interstate commerce, it seems commonsense to suggest
that they both shape and define individual property rights in
non-navigable airspace. The implication of these substantive
rights is more immediately acceptable under the Braniff vision
of airspace than under Aaron’s vision. Nevertheless, Aaron’s vision may be more consistent with the Supreme Court’s substantive rights doctrine. In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court indicated that the Federal Government’s
prerogative to regulate diminishes when such regulations negatively implicate rights traditionally within the purview of state
regulation.138 Although Windsor spoke to marriage rights—long
135. See generally supra Part I.C.
136. Bydlon v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 764, 770 (1959) (expounding upon
Braniff’s outline of federal power); see also supra Part I.D.
137. See supra Part I.D.
138. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (“[T]he
Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy de-
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recognized as fundamental,139 unlike economic property rights
in airspace140—history demonstrates that states have long
shaped and defined individual rights in airspace.141
Although one might note that federal laws and applicable
doctrine by definition shape and define individual rights in airspace, the same laws and doctrines also defer substantially to
individual rights in airspace, as well as state prerogatives to
shape and define these rights. The Court in Causby abrogated
the ad coelum doctrine and substantially reduced individual
claims to overlying airspace, but it also reaffirmed individual
property rights in airspace within the “immediate reaches of
the enveloping atmosphere,” and it confirmed that airspace was
capable of appropriation, as understood and recognized since
Roman times as a common law precept.142 Further, the ACA
permitted states to “set apart and provide for the protection of
necessary airspace reservations in addition to and not in conflict either with airspace reservations established by the President . . . or with any civil or military airway” established pursuant to the Act, which suggests congressional deference to a
greater degree of state influence below the navigable airspace.143 Such deference is not novel when privately owned
property interests are at stake.144 That variable state standards (with regards to trespass, nuisance, and other doctrines
that similarly implicate individuals’ substantive rights in aircisions with respect to domestic relations.”).
139. See generally, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating
all anti-miscegenation laws).
140. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (noting Penn Central’s rights to the airspace above its property yet
not finding city’s restrictions on uses of this airspace to be a compensable taking).
141. See supra Parts I.A, D.
142. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
143. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, 41 Pub. L. 568, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568,
570 (1926).
144. Consider, for instance, the fact that most zoning codes have prohibited
(in varying degrees) commercial activity in residential areas for nearly a century. E.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and
the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1194–95 (2001)
(“[I]ndividuals who want to work at home face significant legal obstacles, especially municipal zoning laws that severely restrict the operation of home
businesses when they do not prohibit them outright.”); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926) (“The segregation of industries, commercial pursuits, and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when
exercised reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the community.”).
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space) remain virtually untouched by federal airspace regulations suggests, as in Windsor, that states’ prerogatives in the
realm of non-navigable airspace remain substantial.145
This analysis does not question the FMRA’s constitutionality. On the contrary, the Commerce Clause almost certainly
gives Congress the power to regulate non-navigable airspace in
a manner that secures the safety of the navigable airspace.146
But in mandating federal approval of all commercial UAS in
non-navigable airspace, the federal government usurps state
prerogatives in the sky, and limits states’ capacity to shape and
define the manner in which the commercial UAS industry develops in their respective jurisdictions. The very prospect that
federal laws of this sort would subordinate state influence in
airspace compelled the ACA’s distinction between navigable
and non-navigable airspace in the first place.147
In addition, the FMRA’s ban on commercial UAS carries
potentially dire ramifications under existing Takings doctrine.
Under Braniff and Aaron, the existence of congressional authority to regulate remains nearly as certain as the determination of federal liability for intrusions in non-navigable airspace.
If, for instance, the federal government passes a regulation
permitting intrusion into non-navigable airspace using the
Commerce Clause, the regulation is legitimate under Braniff,
but likely a taking under Aaron.148 In the context of commercial
UAS regulation in non-navigable airspace, this analysis could
145. See, e.g., supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text; see also Abdullah
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Even though we have
found federal preemption of the standards of aviation safety, we still conclude
that the traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to exist for violation of those standards. Federal preemption of the standards of care can coexist with state and territorial tort remedies.”).
146. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
256 (1964) (recognizing congressional power under the Commerce Clause “to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses”); cf. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426
(1940) (“[A]uthority [to regulate navigable waters] is as broad as the needs of
commerce. Water power development from dams in navigable streams is from
the public’s standpoint a by-product of the general use of the rivers for commerce.”).
147. See supra note 48.
148. Whether the regulation would require compensation remains uncertain. The Aaron court faced a physical, rather than regulatory, intrusion. See
supra notes 74–76. Its language suggests, however, that regulatory intrusion
may be equally problematic. See Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798, 801
(1963) (suggesting that courts consider “whether the relevant statutes and
regulations [permitting damage to private property interests] violated the
property owner’s constitutional rights” (emphasis added)).
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support a finding that the FMRA works an unprecedentedly
massive taking, because even commercial UAS activity that
does not affect interstate commerce and which does not occur in
a channel of commerce is essentially prohibited, at least until
the FAA’s regulations are implemented permanently.149 Individuals who acquired property with the understanding that
they could use inexpensive technology such as UAS to assist
their small-scale enterprises, and who cannot otherwise utilize
their airspace in a manner that is commercially feasible, may
have a colorable constitutional claim against the federal government. This will ring especially true when the value of the
airspace is distinguishable from the parcel’s value, as is sometimes the case with wind estates.150 In one sense, such a taking
is tantamount to pre-ACA suggestions that the federal government simply use its power of eminent domain to acquire all airspace.151
Though the latter statements may raise some eyebrows,
the possible constitutional claims to which this Note refers remain fully distinguishable from ostensibly adverse Supreme
Court precedent. For instance, one likely counterargument,
149. This formulation remains simplistic in several respects, but not altogether unlikely. One could object that a taking in this context is unlikely because, like development moratoria, the ban is temporary. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323
(2002) (refusing to find that temporary regulatory moratoria effect a per se
taking on affected landowners). Further, the Supreme Court has previously
refused to enjoin government action “forbid[ding] the private use of certain
airspace.” Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)). Unless the regulation reduces an entire parcel’s property value markedly, one might say, such regulation would not require compensation as a taking. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
These objections, while formidable, are surmountable. Indeed, the temporary prohibition on commercial UAS use is but a placeholder for onerous future burdens on all such use currently in the making, and imposed by the federal government. See supra note 16. Moreover, sweeping impediments to
commercial use of all private airspace are far more difficult to justify than limitations on the use of “certain” private airspace, as was the case in Penn Central. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302. Because all government actions, in this
respect, must at least be rational, see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131, this difference in scope remains highly relevant to any Takings inquiry. As Troy Rule
points out, scholars and courts have recently proved more amenable than not
to the argument that airspace is a natural resource, and that damage to interests therein may constitute a complete loss. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace and the
Takings Clause, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 421, 465 & nn.205–10 (2012). If, therefore, the federal government’s regulatory authority is found constitutional, its
exercise thereof may require more money than it is prepared to deliver.
150. See Rule, supra note 149.
151. See BANNER, supra note 25, at 99–100.
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enunciated in Andrus v. Allard, is that depriving property of its
most profitable use does not and should not necessarily constitute a governmental taking.152 In Allard, however, Congressional authority to regulate the property at issue (eagle feathers) in the manner at issue (taking, selling, and purchasing)
was plainly reasonable. A conspicuous absence of dissenters in
the case, coupled with the commonsense observation that permitting the sale of pre-Eagle Protection Act feathers⎯often indistinguishable from post-Eagle Protection Act feathers⎯would
facilitate circumvention of the law, validate this statement.153
Airspace, by contrast, is murkier property insofar as its value is
more difficult to quantify, and the sense in subjecting it to comprehensive regulation seems dubious at best.154 The scope of
the FAA’s regulations, both present and future, remains difficult to justify under the Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions. Even when juxtaposed with the Court’s Penn Central
case, which refused to find a regulatory taking of airspace, the
Court only considered the legitimacy of local law in a narrowly
confined airspace arena.155 In short, this author was unable to
discern any Supreme Court precedent precluding a successful
Takings claim against the government in this context.156
Taken alongside concerns regarding the FMRA’s impact on
states’ prerogative to regulate airspace, the current state of the
law contravenes prominent federalist policies and concerns
spanning the entire development of airspace regulation, and
may impose nearly insurmountable administrative burdens on
the federal government with regards to Takings liability.157
Everybody loses. In truth, though, this problem is the child of
uncertainty as to the balance of power between states and the
federal government, as well as the reach of federal authority in
152. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
153. See id. at 58.
154. See supra Part II.B (“[T]here is no clear reason why commercial UAS
in non-navigable airspace pose more danger to airspace as a channel of commerce than hobbyist model aircraft.”).
155. See supra note 149. Indeed, this Note, like the Supreme Court, does
not take issue with local laws of the sort at issue in Penn Central; it is federal
action that remains concerning.
156. Other adverse precedent addressing inverse condemnation, like Allard
and Penn Central, is readily distinguishable. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a local ordinance precluding brickmaking because it regulated an easily identifiable nuisance).
157. See generally supra Part I.B (discussing early congressional efforts to
harness airspace, and noting that Congress elected not to use its war powers
in asserting regulatory authority therein).
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airspace under the Commerce Clause. Dispelling the uncertainty will diminish its attendant fallout.
III. DRAIN THE SKY: THE NEED TO DISCARD
UNNECESSARY REGULATIONS
The federal government has flooded the sky with regulations, including the FMRA’s effective ban on commercial UAS
use. The ban is not technically absolute, for an opportunistic
individual or organization could seek a certificate of authorization to use UAS below the navigable airspace; the issue is that
the FAA only rarely considers issuing such certificates, and
when it does, it subjects the certificate holder to exceedingly
rigorous standards.158 Amending the FMRA to include a jurisdictional element would serve to shield not only the FMRA, but
the FAA’s future regulatory efforts—and its recently released
proposed rules159—from legal challenge, while providing concrete guidance to both individuals and regulatory actors on
what is and is not permitted.160
The jurisdictional element, the benefits one might expect to
flow therefrom, and the hurdles to be overcome in the process
are addressed in Section A. Section B then recognizes the practical limitations of amending the FMRA, but responds that
greater clarity in the law substantially eliminates open questions as to authority to govern airspace, as well as the extent of
an individual’s stake in her overlying airspace, both of which
plague the modern regulatory framework. Simply put, including a jurisdictional element in the FMRA would foster growth
in the UAS industry by draining the sky of superfluous regulation.
A. TEMET NOSCE: A JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT WILL CLARIFY
ROLES AND RIGHTS
The FMRA’s definition of “model aircraft,” a class of aircraft immune from FAA regulation, permits only “hobby or rec158. See, e.g., Astraeus Aerial, Docket No. FAA-2014-0352 (FAA Sept. 25,
2014); see also Kellington & Berger, supra note 9.
159. See supra note 103.
160. Of course, this guidance will not cure all. Some commentators have
deemed the regulatory process confusing and circular, leading to many dead
ends. See Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary
Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355, 396 (2015); Samuel D. Posnick, Note, A
Merry-Go-Round of Metal and Manipulation: Toward a New Framework for
Commodity Exchange Self-Regulation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 441, 454−60 (2015).
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reational use,” implicitly excluding commercial use.161 Seen
alongside the FAA’s interpretation of AC 91-57, it seems likely
that the law, as it currently stands, is a sweeping bar to commercial UAS use by the great majority of landowners with a
stake in productive use of their overlying airspace. Following
Huerta v. Pirker, however, which indicated that AC 91-57 does
not qualify as binding law,162 still proves treacherous for individuals and businesses. The FAA, after all, continues to issue
cease-and-desist letters threatening litigation.163 For this reason, there seems a bald need for more clarity in the law as to
permissible and impermissible activity, for the sake of individual, corporate, and government entities alike. Subsection 1
proposes a concrete way to achieve this clarity and outlines the
manifold benefits to be expected therefrom, while Subsection 2
acknowledges some practical, but manageable, difficulties that
may complicate progressive efforts.
1. Amending the FMRA
Amending a jurisdictional element into the FMRA’s definition of “model aircraft”—that is, changing “the aircraft is flown
strictly for hobby or recreational use”164 to “the aircraft is flown
for hobby, recreational, or other use not in or affecting commerce”—would considerably help alleviate this confusion. Such
an amendment would confine the scope of the Act, and subsequent regulations, to either activities in the navigable airspace
or to activities in non-navigable airspace which in fact affect interstate commerce. The resulting benefits would be three-fold:
(1) promoting clarity in the law and narrowing the regulatory
role of the FAA; (2) defining and reinforcing individuals’ legitimate interests in airspace; and (3) carving out an area of influence for state and municipal entities with an interest in guiding the use and development of UAS in their respective
jurisdictions.
As written, the FMRA perpetuates a flawed theory of federal regulatory power. Non-navigable airspace is not a channel
of commerce, despite its proximity to navigable airspace. Supreme Court doctrine thus requires that the object of regulation
161. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
§ 336(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012).
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See supra note 10.
164. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
§ 336(a)(1).
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either qualifies as an instrument of commerce or an activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce.165 Because the
FMRA does not regulate an instrumentality of commerce, the
only theory that justifies its effective ban considers all commercial UAS operation below non-navigable airspace to affect interstate commerce, a dubious prospect at best. So long as the
FAA asserts regulatory authority over all commercial activities
in airspace, the regulatory framework’s conformity with Supreme Court doctrine will remain vulnerable to challenge, and
Pirker leaves reason to believe that the federal government
may well lose its interpretive battle in the courts.
The Court in Lopez struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act due, in part, to the fact that it lacked a jurisdictional
element. It said that without a jurisdictional element “which
might limit [the Act’s] reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce,” the statute prohibited activity
without a tie to interstate commerce, and thus exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.166 Although commercial drone activity, unlike firearm possession, plainly seems
commercial, many commercial UAS uses would not have a
“substantial effect . . . visible to the naked eye” on interstate
commerce.167 Tweaking the FMRA’s definition of “model aircraft” to include commercial activity not in or affecting interstate commerce would sidestep this issue and handily confine
congressional authority, and FAA regulatory authority, to constitutionally enumerated criteria. Not only would this insulate
the FMRA from constitutional attack, but it would also narrow
the FAA’s regulatory role in a manner that simplifies enforcement of existing law, thereby conserving valuable government
resources rather than wasting them on frivolous cease-anddesist letters and elaborate administrative battles.
States, municipalities, and individuals would reap a massive benefit from such an amendment as well. Those who are
eager to utilize commercial UAS on a small scale would be able
to take definitive steps towards incorporating UAS into their
business practices. This is particularly significant to the emerging precision farming practice, for which UAS are an inexpensive substitute to costly alternatives.168 States which suffer
165.
166.
167.
168.

See supra Part II.B.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (emphasis added).
Id. at 563.
See Drones for Agricultural Crop Surveillance, PRECISION DRONE,
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from water shortages or scarcity of resources, like California,
could meaningfully benefit from a farming community able to
utilize UAS to monitor their fields and allocate water and resources more efficiently and effectively. In other fields, too, the
capacity to use commercial UAS would not only awaken a
promising market, but also provide an opportunity for the inchoate industry to grow and develop alongside evident and urgent communal needs. That these benefits would coincide with
more robust protections for individuals’ property interests in
airspace generally, thereby buttressing individuals’ tangential
interests in privacy and property, is an added bonus. States
and municipalities, in turn, would benefit from “having a say”
in how individuals and organizations could use UAS, and in encouraging certain uses having peculiar benefit to the state.
Put simply, airspace extends from the space between
blades of grass up to the stratosphere.169 The federal government lays claim to all of it, and until now, their position was
largely accepted, as the uses one could put to airspace remained limited.170 The emerging UAS industry’s everexpanding list of productive capacities171 makes this comparatively narrow area of non-navigable airspace far more valuable
than ever before. As such, the federal government’s position is
untenable and unwise in the evolving arena of airspace, and
entities at all levels have much to gain and nothing to lose in
changing course. Any change, however, must predate the FAA’s
regulations in order to maximize its potential benefits.
2. Getting There and Back Again
Including a jurisdictional element in the FMRA is not a
minor change. It would represent a sea change in the scheme
and theory of federal power over airspace thus far. The FAA
does not simply choose not to regulate model aircraft, but is
prohibited from regulating them in the text of the FMRA.172 If
http://www.precisiondrone.com/agriculture (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (“Using
drones for crop surveillance can drastically increase farm crop yields while
minimizing the cost of walking the fields or airplane fly-over filming.”).
169. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “airspace” as
“[t]he space that extends upward from the surface of land”).
170. See generally Parts I.B, II.A.
171. See, e.g., Joseph Dussault, 7 Commercial Uses for Drones, BOS. GLOBE
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.boston.com/business/2014/03/14/commercial-uses
-for-drones/dscS47PsQdPneIB2UQeY0M/story.html.
172. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336,
126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012).
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the FMRA is amended to include a jurisdictional element, then
Congress essentially says that the federal government—and by
extension, the FAA—does not have exclusive sovereignty over
airspace. As discussed, this is likely already true, but the proposition nevertheless contravenes a nearly century-old federal
policy and a strictly top-down regulatory framework. This is
not, therefore, an issue the FAA takes lightly.
Add to this Americans’ skepticism of UAS,173 and surpassing the already-inevitable congressional gridlock may seem
improbable. A recent poll suggests a 2:1 ratio of Americans opposed to commercial operation of UAS against those in favor,
although there was more support for uses like “inspecting oil
platforms and bridges,” mapping “terrain through aerial photography,” and “monitor[ing] wildlife.”174 This skepticism will
certainly temper any attempt to corral the requisite political
capital to amend the FMRA.
In lieu of an amendment to the FMRA, states should continue to promulgate regulations relating to UAS. Already,
many states have passed laws relating to intrastate UAS use in
anticipation of the economic benefits expected to flow therefrom.175 Although uncertainty in the law has compelled some
states to hedge and qualify enacted measures,176 the Pirker decisions—alongside the history belying the current regulatory
framework—cast doubt upon the federal government’s asserted
supremacy in the field. If states begin to promote their interests in non-navigable airspace, they will gain headway in shaping and defining the manner by which individuals utilize airspace, particularly UAS, in their jurisdictions.
B. HAVING THE CAKE AND EATING SOME
Amending the FMRA will not eliminate the ambiguities
inherent in the modern regulatory framework that governs airspace. Even if the federal government’s regulatory power in
this area is construed as limited to navigable airspace or activi173. See Turza, supra note 12, at 321 (“Many Americans are skeptical, if
not outright scared, of having drones flying over suburbia invading their backyard barbeque privacy.”).
174. Joan Lowy & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Americans Skeptical of Commercial Drones, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 19, 2014), http://phys.org/news/2014-12-poll
-americans-skeptical-commercial-drones.html.
175. See, e.g., S. 1892, 2014 Gen. Assemb., 108th Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014).
176. See, e.g., H.R. 1029, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (“The provisions
of this Section shall apply unless preempted by applicable federal law or by
regulations adopted by the [FAA].”).
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ties in non-navigable airspace that affect interstate commerce,
a great many small-scale activities may indeed fall within the
ambit of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.177
Further, the FAA and Congress may persist in their theory
that the federal government reigns supreme above state and
municipal governments in the realm of navigable and nonnavigable airspace, despite conceding that “model aircraft” include those aircraft used for commercial purposes which do not
affect interstate commerce. The FAA, for instance, may continue sending cease-and-desist letters to individuals and companies that utilize UAS, and may continue pursuing litigation
against individuals like Raphael Pirker. Regulatory efforts,
likewise, may continue to flow from the federal government,
with states reticently asserting authority in its wake, and subject to federal preemption. The battle for control over airspace
will persist until resolved definitively.
Nor will an amendment address the FAA’s safety concerns
about UAS in the national airspace. The proximity of nonnavigable airspace requires UAS operators to ensure their UAS
can adequately maintain a safe altitude, steer clear of airports,
and remain within their line of sight. Indeed, on the rare occasion that the FAA issues a certificate of authorization to private parties for commercial UAS operations, it indicates the
importance of preserving the integrity of the navigable airspace, and of protecting persons and property on the ground.178
Furthermore, the FMRA cements the FAA’s right to pursue action against anyone who recklessly operates a UAS.179 The
FAA’s prime duty, historically, has been to ensure safety in the
air and on the ground with regard to air commerce. There
177. This might depend on the size and influence of the entity using the
technology. A large-scale farming operation that undertakes to use commercial
UAS to facilitate its enterprise may well have a greater impact on interstate
commerce than a local farmer who oversees one or two parcels. A national
news agency that uses drones to gather photographs may be subject to federal
regulation, as compared to a local news company whose influence and readership remains narrowly confined to a single (or several) localities. A powerful
film company that employs drones to capture footage for use in a major motion
picture would likely fall within the scope of federal regulatory power, whereas
an independent filmmaker may not. Of course, the distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local remains a thorny issue, see generally
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and any speculation on the impact of
these activities should be tempered by the prospect of further clarification
from Congress and the courts.
178. See Astraeus Aerial, Docket No. FAA-2014-0352 (FAA Sept. 25, 2014).
179. See supra note 5.
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seems little doubt, therefore, that safety considerations weigh
heavily on Congress’s decision to effectively bar commercial
UAS before the FAA issues a comprehensive system of regulations. Amending the FMRA, and thereby permitting small-scale
use of UAS in non-navigable airspace across the country, leaves
issues posed by large-scale use of UAS unaddressed.
Despite these limitations, an amendment to the FMRA
would serve to clarify somewhat persistent ambiguities in the
modern regulatory framework that needlessly complicate enforcement efforts. Although ambiguity will remain as to what
level of government controls what altitudes under what circumstances, the proposed amendment would send a clear message that non-navigable airspace falls primarily within states’
prerogative and preserves individual interests in airspace. This
message does not substantially abrogate federal authority over
non-navigable airspace so much as it shifts the balance of regulatory power over non-navigable airspace toward the states. Its
message is implicit, not explicit, and the prospective benefits it
offers to individuals, states, and even the FAA far outweigh the
abstract loss of federal regulatory control over a narrow spatial
corridor.
Additionally, the FAA cannot offer a satisfactory safetybased justification for expansive regulatory power over nonnavigable airspace. As discussed, commercial UAS and model
aircraft operating below navigable airspace pose identical risks
to persons and property on the ground.180 Why one should go
unregulated while the other idles in a legal purgatory seems
inexplicable, and at times utterly counterintuitive. Indeed, the
FMRA fails to specify what altitudes “model aircraft” operators
should or should not maintain, indicating that one may fly a
model aircraft (strictly for hobby or recreational use) in the
navigable airspace without violating any relevant law or regulation. If the FAA considers model aircraft in the navigable airspace safe, then small-scale commercial operation of UAS below
the navigable airspace cannot possibly pose any special danger
to the navigable airspace, let alone persons or property on the
ground. The proposed amendment would therefore not jeopardize the security of the national airspace system.

180. See supra Part II.B.
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CONCLUSION
Entities at all levels—that is, the federal government,
states, municipalities, and individuals—share interests in preserving the integrity of the national airspace system. The federal government, however, has asserted sovereignty over all
airspace, thereby reducing the primacy of other entities’ interests in using and controlling activities within overlying airspace. This state of the law is inconsistent with the history and
development of airspace regulation, which reflects an unabating recognition of individual interests in overlying airspace, as
well as pervasive state prerogative to shape and define individuals’ rights to use and enjoy that space. In this respect, there
seems an incompatibility between the current regulatory hierarchy and the rights traditionally afforded individuals to superadjacent airspace.
The advent of commercial UAS technology brings this conflict to the fore. Commercial UAS carry the potential to transform the way individual and governmental entities use and
govern airspace. But federal policy, as it stands now, has hampered individuals’ capacity to make productive use of UAS, and
stifled the developing UAS industry. Amending the FMRA’s
definition of “model aircraft” to permit commercial uses not in
or affecting commerce would address this issue by clarifying
federal and state roles in regulating airspace, and by protecting
individual interests in airspace. The additional clarity such an
amendment would imbue in the modern regulatory landscape
with regard to federal and state authority would provide longlasting benefits to the structure and content of both federal and
state regulations in the future. As a result, the states and individuals with a significant interest in commercial operations of
UAS would find themselves able to pursue these interests
without federal interference, and in a manner that allows the
young industry to grow and develop to meet local needs around
the country.

